To Exhaust or Not to Exhaust: The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act Requires Prisoners to Exhaust All Administrative Remedies before Filing Excessive Force Claims in Federal Court by McGill, Danielle M.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1-1-2002
To Exhaust or Not to Exhaust: The Prisoner
Litigation Reform Act Requires Prisoners to
Exhaust All Administrative Remedies before Filing
Excessive Force Claims in Federal Court
Danielle M. McGill
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cleveland
State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Note, To Exhaust or Not to Exhaust: The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act Requires Prisoners to Exhaust All Administrative Remedies
before Filing Excessive Force Claims in Federal Court, 50 Clev. St. L. Rev. 129 (2002-2003)
 129 
TO EXHAUST OR NOT TO EXHAUST?: THE PRISONER 
LITIGATION REFORM ACT REQUIRES PRISONERS TO 
EXHAUST ALL ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BEFORE 
FILING EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIMS IN FEDERAL COURT 
 
 I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 130 
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF  
  THE PRISONER LITIGATION REFORM ACT ............................ 133 
A. The Need for the Prisoner Litigation  
 Reform Act ................................................................... 133 
B. The Amended Language of 1997e(a)........................... 138 
 III. THE CONFLICT AMONG THE FEDERAL COURTS .................... 140 
A. The Third, Sixth and Seventh  
 Circuits Require Exhaustion........................................ 141 
 1. Freeman v. Francis .............................................. 141 
 2. Booth v. Churner .................................................. 143 
 3. Smith v. Zachary ................................................... 144 
B. The Second Circuit Does Not  
 Require Exhaustion...................................................... 145 
III. THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT  
  INCLUDES EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIMS ................................. 147 
A. The Definition of “Prison Conditions”  
 Includes the Use of Excessive Force ........................... 148 
B. The Purpose and Legislative History  
 of 1997e(a) Supports Exhaustion of  
 Excessive Force Claims ............................................... 153 
1. Congress’ Purpose of Deterring  
 Frivolous Prisoner Litigation  
 Requires Exhaustion............................................. 154 
2. Exhaustion Furthers the PLRA’s  
 Purpose of Preventing Judicial  
 Micromanagement Over Prison  
 Administrations .................................................... 155 
C. Two Supreme Court Decisions Add  
 to the View that the PLRA’s Exhaustion  
 Requirement Includes Claims of  
 Excessive Force ........................................................... 156 
 1. McCarthy v. Bronson............................................ 156 
 2. Booth v. Churner .................................................. 158 
 
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2002
130 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:129 
D. Efficiency Requires Exhaustion of  
 Excessive Force Claims ............................................... 160 
 V. CONCLUSION........................................................................ 162 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A prisoner finishes his first serving of ice cream and demands another.  Prison 
guards inform the prisoner they cannot permit a second serving.  In response, the 
prisoner throws a tantrum, screaming and yelling.  The guards, in an effort to quiet 
the prisoner and keep order in the prison, gather the prisoner’s arms behind him.  The 
prisoner, still ranting and raving, resists the restraint by flinging his arms and legs in 
every direction and striking the guards.  In doing so, the prisoner bumps his head, 
causing a lump and bruise.  This sounds ridiculous – A grown man ranting and 
raving for a second serving of ice cream.  Perhaps, but what is more ridiculous is 
what followed – a lawsuit against the prison guards claiming they exerted excessive 
force upon the prisoner.  This situation is what Congress refers to as “frivolous 
prisoner litigation.”1 
Because of situations like the one above, the federal courts experienced a 
dramatic increase in prisoner litigation.  From 1980 to 1996, petitions filed by state 
and federal prisoners nearly tripled, from 23,230 to 68,235.2  Yet, the courts 
dismissed 62% of these prisoners’ petitions and less than 2% of such petitions were 
adjudicated in favor of the prisoner.3  Because of lack of legal merit, these prisoner 
lawsuits proved to be frivolous and extremely burdensome on the federal judiciary.4  
As a result, Congress was faced with the need to balance the prisoners’ right to 
                                                                
1This a fabricated story fashioned after the facts presented in Lyell v. Schachle, No. 1-95-
0035, 1996 WL 391557, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 28, 1996). 
2JOHN SCALIA, BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, PRISONER PETITIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, 
1980-1996: FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS PROGRAM, 1 (1974). 
3Id.  
4See Lyell, 1996 WL 391557, at *1 (arguing cruel and unusual punishment arose out of a 
denial of a second serving of ice cream) (“this case is illustrative of what gives prisoner 
litigation a bad odor”); Rudd v. Jones, 879 F. Supp. 621, 622 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (claiming that 
courts are “drowning in frivolous prisoner complaints”); Scher v. Purkett, 758 F. Supp. 1316, 
1316-17 (E.D. Mo. 1991), aff’d, 62 F.3d 1421 (8th Cir. 1995) (arguing a denial of shampoo 
and deodorant is a violation of a prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights) (“Scher files these suits 
to harass the defendants and provide a source of amusement for himself.”); Cotner v. 
Campbell, 618 F. Supp. 1091, 1095 (E.D. Okla. 1985) aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom 
Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1986) (“the sheer volume of these prisoners’ cases 
causes extreme frustration and hardship”); Eugene J. Kuzinski, Note, The End of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 361, 361 (1998) (“the PLRA is a necessary 
Congressional measure designed to rectify serious problems surrounding the federal courts’ 
involvement with state prison inmates”); see also 141 CONG. REC. 26,548 (1995).  Senator 
Dole mentions a number of prisoner claims that were apparently frivolous in nature, such as 
suits involving “insufficient storage locker space, a defective haircut by a prisoner barber, the 
failure of prison officials to invite a prisoner to a pizza party for a departing prison employee, 
and yes, being served chunky peanut butter instead of the creamy variety.”  Id.   
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss1/8
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judicial inquiry, and the taxpayers’ interest in reducing costs associated with these 
frivolous claims.5   
To alleviate the burden of prisoners’ claims on the federal courts, Congress 
amended the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (hereinafter CRIPA)6 in 
1996.7  The amended Act, now referred to as the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act 
(hereinafter PLRA),8 places firmer limits on inmates’ access to the courts.9  Despite 
the PLRA and Congress’ intention to reduce the burden of prisoner litigation on the 
federal court system, these limits created considerable litigation regarding the Act’s 
application.10  More specifically, the PLRA’s requirement of administrative 
                                                                
5141 CONG. REC. 26,449 (1995) (relying on the National Association of Attorneys 
General’s estimations that frivolous prisoner litigation has cost the taxpayers close to $81.3 
million); 141 CONG. REC. 26,553 (1995) (“It is time to stop this ridiculous waste of the 
taxpayers’ money.  The huge costs imposed on State governments to defend against these 
meritless suits is another kind of crime committed against law-abiding citizens.”). 
6Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (1994 
& Supp. V 1999). 
7Senator Dole, joined with Senators Hatch, Kyl, Abraham, Hutchison, Reid, Thurmond, 
Specter, Santorum, D’Amato, Gramm, and Bond, introduced the PLRA as amendments to the 
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act “to address the alarming explosion in the number 
of frivolous lawsuits filed by State and Federal prisoners.”  141 CONG. REC. 26,548 (1995).  
Senator Dole noted that the overabundance of frivolous prisoner lawsuits “tie up the courts, 
waste valuable legal resources, and affect the quality of justice enjoyed by law-abiding 
citizens.”  Id.   
8Congress amended the CRIPA in 1996 with a set of amendments known as the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act.  Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-
810, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1932, 
1346, 42 U.S.C. 1997 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).  
The applicable amendment regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies will be 
referred to as the PLRA or section 1997e(a) as codified in the United States Code.  This 
section will be cited as 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).    
Throughout this Note, the CRIPA prior to the amendments will be referred to as the 
CRIPA.  The relevant section prior to the amendments was designated as § 7(a) in the CRIPA.  
Hereinafter, citations to this CRIPA section will be omitted and the United States Code will be 
used to cite to the old version of § 1997e(a)(1) (cited as 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1) (1994)).  
9See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Id. at § 1932; Id. at § 1915A(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  These 
limits include: (1) excluding lawsuits filed by prisoners who previously had three petitions 
dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a cause of action; (2) annulling release 
credit earned by a prisoner because the prisoner filed a frivolous claim; (3) allowing sua 
sponte dismissals of any claims that fail to state a cause of action; and (4) requiring prisoners 
to exhaust administrative remedies regarding “prison conditions” before filing suit.  Id. 
10See Booth v. Churner, 121 S. Ct. 1819, 1825 (2001) (holding that under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997e(a), a prisoner seeking only monetary damages must complete any prison 
administrative remedies even if the process does not make specific provisions for monetary 
relief); Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom, Porter v. 
Nussle, 532 U.S. 1065 (2001) (holding that section 1997e(a)’s requirement of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies does not apply to claims of excessive force); Smith v. Zachary, 255 
F.3d 446, 452 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that section 1997e(a) states that administrative 
remedies must be exhausted before filing suit in court claiming excessive force).  
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2002
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exhaustion in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) caused particular problems for the courts 
regarding prisoners’ excessive force claims brought under the Eighth Amendment. 11 
Section 1997e(a) provides that “no action shall be brought with respect to prison 
conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner 
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative 
remedies as are available are exhausted.”12  The conflict regarding excessive force 
claims centers on the statutory phrase “prison conditions.”13  As a result, an intense 
dispute among the circuits surfaced regarding whether excessive force claims made 
by inmates are “prison conditions” under 1997e(a), ultimately requiring prisoners to 
exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court.14 
This Note addresses this issue and recommends that excessive force claims be 
subject to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, thereby requiring an inmate to 
exhaust administrative remedies before filing an excessive force suit in federal court.  
Requiring exhaustion for excessive force claims will help solve the problems 
associated with the overabundance of frivolous prisoner litigation and the federal 
judiciary’s unnecessary interference into the nation’s prison administrations.  
Moreover, the excessive force issue is in the forefront because the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in Porter v. Nussle,15 a case dealing exclusively with this issue.  
The lower court, in Nussle v. Willette,16 allowed an inmate plaintiff’s excessive force 
claim even though the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies.17  This 
decision caused a kink in what seemed to be a consensus among the United States 
Appellate Courts’ requiring exhaustion.  Therefore, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Porter may provide the possible conclusion to a debate that began in the courts with 
the PLRA.   
Part II of this Note begins by identifying the amendments of the PLRA, as well 
as the justifications for these amendments.  Part III illustrates the split among the 
circuits regarding the applicability of excessive force claims to the exhaustion 
requirement.  The discussion begins at Part IV, which asserts that the exhaustion 
requirement includes claims of excessive force.  In making this determination, Part 
IV defines the phrase “prison conditions” and discusses the applicability of an 
excessive force claim to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.  Next, this Part 
                                                                
11
 Compare Nussle, 224 F.3d at 106, Baskerville v. Goord, No. 97 Civ. 6413, 1998 WL 
292421, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 1998), White v. Fauver, 19 F. Supp. 2d 305, 316 (D.N.J. 
1998), and Johnson v. O’Malley, No. 96 Civ. 6598, 1998 WL 292421, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 19, 
1998) (finding exhaustion required), with Smith, 255 F.3d at 452, Higginbottom v. Carter, 223 
F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 2000), Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 298 (3d Cir. 2000), aff’d 
on other grounds, 532 U.S. 731 (2001), Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 644 (6th Cir. 
1999), Wendell v. Asher, 162 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 1998), Garrett v. Hawk, 127 F.3d 1263, 
1265 (10th Cir. 1997), and Beeson v. Fishkill Corr. Facility, 28 F. Supp. 2d 884, 889 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding exhaustion required). 
1242 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1994 & Supp. V 2000). 
13See supra note 11. 
14See id. 
15532 U.S. 1065 (2001). 
16224 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2000). 
17Id.  
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proposes that the purpose and legislative history of the PLRA support a conclusion 
that excessive force claims are encompassed by the exhaustion requirement.  Part IV 
continues with a discussion of Supreme Court cases, which confirm that the PLRA’s 
exhaustion requirement includes claims of excessive force.  Finally, this Part 
contends that the most efficient and effective process for the prisoner, as well as for 
the prison systems and federal judiciary, is to require exhaustion of excessive force 
claims.  This Note concludes that requiring exhaustion of excessive force claims is 
the appropriate solution to the serious problems that plague the federal court system 
and the nation’s prison administrations.  Therefore, the Supreme Court should 
reverse the Second Circuit’s decision in Nussle v. Willette, and hold that excessive 
force claims are “prison conditions,” and therefore, subject to the exhaustion 
requirement of section 1997e(a).    
II.  THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRISONER LITIGATION REFORM ACT 
Following the enactment of the CRIPA in 1980, federal courts encountered 
massive numbers of frivolous lawsuits, which proved greatly burdensome on the 
federal judiciary.18  Additionally, these lawsuits led to substantial legal costs 
associated with taxpayer dollars.19  Moreover, the federal judiciary was interfering 
tremendously with the orderly administration of the nation’s prisons.20  To remedy 
these serious concerns, Congress proposed amendments to the CRIPA, the Prisoner 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which was signed into law by President Clinton on 
April 26, 1996.21   
A.  The Need for the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act 
From 1980 to 1996, federal courts experienced an alarming increase in prisoner 
litigation.  Within 16 years, petitions filed by prisoners swelled by nearly 300%, 
from 23,230 to 68,235.22  Specifically, in 1994, inmates filed over 39,000 lawsuits, 
an alarming 15% rise in suits filed the previous year.23  More astonishingly, the 
greater part of these suits completely lacked legal merit.24  In 1994, nearly “94.7% of 
the lawsuits were dismissed before the pre-trial phase, and only a scant 3.1% have 
enough validity to reach trial.”25   
The increase in the number of suits, 95% of which proved to be meritless, was a 
major concern for all involved, even the prisoners.26  These concerns regarding 
                                                                
18See supra note 4, and accompanying text. 
19See supra note 5, and accompanying text. 
20See 141 CONG. REC. 35,980 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. 26,554 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. 
26,448 (1995).  
21See supra note 8, and accompanying text. 
22SCALIA, supra note 2. 
23141 CONG. REC. 26,548 (1995). 
24Id. 
25Id. 
26Id. at 26,548, 26,553.  Senator Dole, along with eleven other Senators, introduced the 
PLRA to curb the amount of frivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners.  Dole also presented a letter 
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frivolous lawsuits were not based solely on statistics.  Concerns also arose after the 
public became aware of specific examples of outlandish suits filed by prisoners.27  
Senator Robert Dole noted that frivolous lawsuits involved such grievances as: 
providing insufficient locker space, giving a defective haircut, not inviting an inmate 
to a pizza party, and even being served chunky peanut butter instead of creamy. 28  
Senator Orrin Hatch also pointed out some noteworthy examples.  One inmate filed a 
frivolous suit because the prison issued Converse shoes, rather than the more stylish 
Reebok or L.A. Gear shoes.29  Another case involved an inmate who deliberately 
flooded his cell, and then sued the prison officials who cleaned up the flood for 
getting his Pinochle cards wet.30  
Congress was not alone in its concern; the federal courts also commented on 
frivolous prisoner litigation.31  As explained earlier, in Lyell v. Schachle, the 
                                                          
written by the National Association of Attorneys General thanking him for his efforts in 
introducing the PLRA.  Id. 
27In 1995, a number of articles were published regarding frivolous prisoner suits.  See 
Sandra Ann Harris, Prisoners’ Lawsuits Swamp Federal Courts, THE NEWS TRIBUNE, Oct. 26, 
1996, at D10; Prisoner Litigation Reform Act Clears Congress; Orrin Hatch, GOV’T PRESS 
RELEASES (Fed. Document Clearing House, Inc., Washington D.C.) Apr. 26, 1996; Dennis C. 
Vacco et al., Letter to the Editor, Free the Courts From Frivolous Prisoner Suits, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 3, 1995, at A26. 
Additionally, prisoners filed frivolous suits all over the country.  See Lyell v. Schachle, 
No. 1-95-0035, 1996 WL 391557 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 28, 1996) (arguing cruel and unusual 
punishment arose out of a denial of a second serving of ice cream); Jones v. Warden of the 
Statesville Corr. Ctr., 918 F. Supp. 1142 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (claiming male inmates should have 
the same rights as women inmates and should be allowed access to bras and panties); Scher v. 
Purkett, 758 F. Supp. 1316 (E.D. Mo. 1991), aff’d, 62 F.3d 1421 (8th Cir. 1995) (arguing a 
denial of shampoo and deodorant is a violation of a prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights); Foy 
v. Dunleavy, Civ. A. No. 87-4897, 1987 WL 28399 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 1987) (complaining the 
prison’s failure to repair the photocopier denies prisoners “access to the courts and a lawyer”).  
28141 CONG. REC. 26,548 (1995).   
29Id. at 26,553. 
30Id. 
31See Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 211 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“with 
less to profitably occupy their time than potential litigants on the outside, and with a justified 
feeling that they have much to gain and virtually nothing to lose, prisoners appear to be far 
more prolific litigants than other groups in the population”); Rudd v. Jones, 879 F. Supp. 621, 
622 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (“It is . . . clearly  obvious that many inmates and their sometimes 
almost professional jailhouse writ writers have abused the process merely to go through the 
exercise, challenge the system again, or get a trip out of the penitentiary for a court hearing”); 
Yocum v. Dixon, 729 F. Supp. 616, 616 (C.D. Ill. 1990) (“This case illustrates the problem 
confronting a district court when a prisoner has too much free time and chooses to free that 
time by inundating the Court with frivolous pro se pleadings and motions.”); James v. 
Quinlan, 886 F.2d 37, 41 n.5 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Gabel v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 124, 125 n.1 
(5th Cir. 1988)) (“setting forth statistics that ‘suggest that pro se civil rights litigation has 
become a recreational activity for state prisoners in our Circuit’”); Cotner v. Campbell, 618 F. 
Supp. 1091, 1095 (E.D. Okla. 1985) aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom Cotner v. Hopkins, 
795 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1986) (“These complaints are but further examples of [Cotner’s] 
malicious intent to disrupt the courts and make others pay for his mistakes”); Gast v. Daily, 
577 F. Supp. 14, 15 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (“it must be stressed that the Court is not a 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss1/8
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prisoner-plaintiff filed a complaint because he was denied a second serving of ice 
cream.32  Writing for the majority, Judge Higgins noted that the case was “illustrative 
of what gives prisoner litigation a bad odor.”33  Judge Higgins went on to explain 
that the judicial system would be ridiculed if he put six law-abiding, taxpaying 
citizens in the jury box to hear an ice cream case.34  Judge Higgins told the plaintiff 
to “grow up and do his time and take his punishment like a man.”35   
Scher v. Purkett 36 is another example of the courts’ fury with prisoners filing 
frivolous lawsuits.  In that case, a prisoner filed a complaint alleging that the 
deprivation of shampoo and deodorant is cruel and unusual punishment.37  The 
prisoner alleged that he was denied “the minimal civilized measure of life’s 
necessities.”38  The court found the prisoner filed suit to harass the defendants and to 
amuse himself.39  Judge Limbaugh, not amused, responded, “[t]he Court is poised to 
demonstrate just how vexed it has become with malcontent inmates who fill their 
idle time, and the Court’s precious time, by filing § 1983 complaints about the petty 
deprivations inherent in prison life.”40 
Some inmates are notorious for the number of frivolous lawsuits they have filed 
during their incarceration.41  In Scher, the court listed twenty cases filed by the 
prisoner, and called him “a frequent filer of prisoner civil rights suits.”42  Judge 
Limbaugh responded to Scher’s 21st complaint by criticizing his malicious use of the 
judicial system and stripping Scher of his ability to file any more suits.43   
The most notorious prisoner-plaintiff, however, would have to be the “Reverend” 
Clovis Carl Green, Jr., who has filed over 700 lawsuits.44  One judge sarcastically 
                                                          
correspondence school for creative writing”); Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1316-17 
(D. Or. 1983), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom., Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221 (9th 
Cir. 1984) (“True to his calling, Franklin has filed a civil rights complaint in this court every 
time somebody does something he does not like.”).  
32Lyell, No. 1-95-0035, 1996 WL 391557, at *1.  
33Id.   
34Id.  
35
 Id.  
36Scher v. Purkett, 758 F. Supp. 1316, 1317 (E.D. Mo. 1991), aff’d, 62 F.3d 1421 (8th Cir. 
1986). 
37Id. at 1316.  
38Id.   
39Id. at 1317.  
40Scher, 758 F. Supp. at 1317.    
41Harry Franklin is an inmate notorious for filing frivolous lawsuits.  See Franklin v. 
Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1316 (D. Or. 1983), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom., Franklin 
v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating “only the finality of death,” either the 
Judge’s or Franklins’, would end the Judge’s torment of “the Harry Franklin saga”).    
42Scher, 758 F. Supp. at 1317.  
43Id. 
44For a list of over 500 suits filed by Green within only seven years see Green v. Camper, 
477 F. Supp. 758, 759-68 (W.D. Mo. 1979).  
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remarked that the Guinness Book of World Records does not contain a category for 
the most lawsuits filed by an individual; therefore, it is difficult to award Green the 
title.45   
Not only do frivolous lawsuits infuriate the judges, but they waste courts’ 
precious time and crowd the federal dockets.  There is no question that prisoner 
litigation is an important segment of any docket.46  Prisoner lawsuits represented 
nearly 25% of all civil suits filed in federal court.47  In particular, in 1994 over 45% 
of all federal civil complaints filed in Arizona were state prisoners’ complaints.48  
Hence, 20,000 Arizona inmates filed nearly the same amount of complaints as the 
3.5 million citizens of Arizona.49   
The volume of these cases frustrated and infuriated anyone who dealt with 
them.50  Prison officials were limited by the funds appropriated to them, yet they 
were bombarded by the long lists of prisoner demands requesting such things as law 
libraries, legal clerks, sufficient prisoner access to libraries and courts, copying 
facilities, and mailing privileges.51  Moreover, prison officials were constantly 
defending themselves against threats of frivolous lawsuits filed by inmates seeking 
revenge.52  Court clerks were also affected by the enormous amount of frivolous 
prisoner claims.53  These clerks filed and indexed hundreds of prisoner petitions, 
issued summons to all named parties, and shuffled and deciphered through the stacks 
of legal papers that followed.54  After the court clerks completed their jobs, the 
deputy court clerks noted each and every document into a docket sheet, which was 
filed, indexed, and stored in facilities already subjected to overcrowding by the 
abundance of other lawsuits.55  The torch was then passed to the state attorneys who 
struggled to understand the vague pleadings.56  Finally, the judges, magistrates, and 
law clerks grappled with the nonconforming, and sometimes illegible, or even 
                                                                
45Green v. Arnold, 512 F. Supp. 650, 651 n.4 (W.D. Tex. 1981).  
46Cotner v. Campbell, 618 F. Supp. 1091, 1095 (E.D. Okla. 1985) aff’d in part, vacated in 
part sub nom, Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1986) (relying on Federal Court 
Management Statistics, p.129 (Admin. Office of the United States Courts, 1984)) (stating that 
the United States District Courts heard 31,307 prisoner claims, which is around 10% of all 
civil suits filed); 141 CONG. REC. 26,548 (stating that 45% of all civil cases filed in Arizona 
are prisoner lawsuits); Id. at 26,543 (stating that 22% of all civil cases filed in Utah are 
prisoner lawsuits); see also HARRIS, supra note 27, at D10; VACCO, supra note 27, at A26. 
47141 CONG. REC. 14,572 (1995). 
48141 CONG. REC. 26,548 (1995). 
49Id. 
50See Cotner, 618 F. Supp. at 1095. 
51Id.   
52Id. 
53Id. 
54See Cotner, 618 F. Supp. at 1095-96. 
55Id. at 1096. 
56Id. 
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incomprehensible pleadings of the prisoners.57  The time spent completing these 
judicial tasks was overly burdensome upon the courts that serve to provide justice 
not only for the prisoners, but also for other citizens of the United States.58 
Along with exploiting the federal docket, defending frivolous lawsuits wasted 
society’s tax dollars.  For instance, a lawsuit filed by a prisoner alleging the right to 
practice martial arts in prison had an estimated systemwide cost of $28,000.59  More 
astonishing was a case where the prisoner claimed a violation of constitutional rights 
because he did not receive five free stamped envelopes.60  This suit cost the system 
$151,000.61  The prisoners did not pay one penny for either of these California 
lawsuits.62  These bills were footed by the law-abiding, taxpaying citizens of 
California.63   
Thirty-three states have estimated that civil rights suits filed by prisoners cost 
these states combined at least $54.5 million each year.64  Using this figure, experts 
have estimated that civil rights suits cost the fifty states, collectively, $81.3 million 
annually.65  This means that the citizens of the United States are dishing out over $81 
million dollars to pay for prisoner lawsuits that, 95% of the time, are found 
meritless.66  Filing frivolous lawsuits is just another type of crime prisoners commit 
against the public.  As Senator Hatch stated:  “these prisoners are victimizing society 
twice – first when they commit the crime that put them in prison, and second when 
they waste our hard-earned tax dollars.”67 
When Congress enacted the PLRA, it was not only concerned with frivolous 
lawsuits, wasting of taxpayers’ dollars, and crowding of dockets.  Congress also 
intended to curtail the federal judiciary’s micromanagement of state prison systems.68  
By rendering constant decisions regarding conditions of confinement, the federal 
                                                                
57Id; see also Rudd v. Jones, 879 F. Supp. at 621, 623 (S.D. Miss. 1995).  In this case, the 
court dismissed the prisoner’s complaint because it “is a confusing, rambling petition that is 
barely coherent” and will not survive the proceedings of a trial.  Id. 
58Cotner, 618 F. Supp. at 1096. 
59HARRIS, supra note 27, at D10.  
60Id. 
61Id. 
62Id.  
63HARRIS, supra note 27, at D10.  
64141 CONG. REC. 38276 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. 26,553 (1995) (Letter by National 
Association of Attorneys General); 141 CONG. REC. 26,448-49 (1995). 
65141 CONG. REC. 38276 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. 26,553 (1995) (Letter by National 
Association of Attorneys General); 141 CONG. REC. 18, 26449 (1995). 
66141 CONG. REC. 38,276 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. 35,980 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. 26,553 
(1995) (Letter by the National Association of Attorneys General); 141 CONG. REC. 26,449 
(1995). 
67141 CONG. REC. 26,553 (1995). 
68141 CONG. REC. 35,980 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. 26,554 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. 26,448 
(1995); see also Kuzinski, supra note 4, at 361. 
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judiciary was ordering the nation’s prison systems to follow numerous guidelines.69  
Soon, there were so many judicial decrees that it was becoming virtually impossible 
for the prison administrations to run the prisons without coming in contact with a 
judicial order.70  As a result, the federal judiciary was literally running the prisons 
from the courtroom.71  Oklahoma Attorney General Drew Edmondson summed it up 
in these words – “It’s time the federal government got out of the business of running 
state prison facilities on a day-to-day basis.”72  Federal judges had literally seized 
control of the correctional institutions.  In 1990, over 1,200 state prison systems were 
operating under the supervision of the federal judiciary in some form, and over forty 
states had some type of order overseeing aspects of prison administration.73  For 
example, New York City was subjected to judicial restraint in nearly every aspect of 
prison conditions when it entered into a fifty-seven page consent decree in 1978.74  
The consent decree, expanding to an astonishing 1,500 pages in 18 years, modified 
something as simple as the number of forks, knives, spoons, and “spoodles” that 
every prison kitchen must supply.75 
The number of frivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners, the overburdened federal 
dockets, the wasting of taxpayer dollars, and the micromanagement over prison 
systems were all concerns that plagued the federal legislatures, as well as the federal 
judiciary, prison systems, and citizens of the United States.  As a result of these 
concerns, a number of Senators proposed several amendments to the CRIPA, and on 
April 26, 1996, the PLRA was enacted.76  
B.  The Amended Language of 1997e(a) 
Congress enacted, and the President signed the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act in 
an effort to prevent frivolous lawsuits, overburden on courts, waste of taxpayer 
dollars, and judicial interference.77  Four specific amendments created by the PLRA 
made it more difficult for prisoners to bring their complaints to federal courts.   
First, absent a showing of imminent danger of serious physical harm, the Act bars 
suits by inmate-plaintiffs who had previously filed three petitions dismissed as 
                                                                
69Review & Outlook: Criminal Oversight, WALL ST. J., June 10, 1996, at A18 (hereinafter 
Criminal Insight). 
70See id. 
71See id. 
72Barbara Hoberock, Prisoners’ Suit Against State is Sent Back to 10th Circuit, TULSA 
WORLD, Oct. 8, 1996, at A7. 
73See Criminal Oversight, supra note 69, at A18. 
74
 The Role of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice in Implementing the Prison Litigation Reform Act: 
Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary U.S. Senate, 104th Cong. 55-56 (1997) (statement 
of Laura A. Chamberlain). 
75Id. 
7628 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Id. at § 1932; Id. at § 1915A(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 
77See generally Criminal Insight, supra note 69. 
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frivolous, malicious, or a failure to state a cause of action.78  Second, the Act revokes 
a prisoner’s earned release credit if he files a frivolous claim.79  Third, the Act allows 
sua sponte dismissals of any claim that fails to state a cause of action.80  Finally, and 
most importantly, the Act amended section 1997e(a) to require prisoners to exhaust 
administrative remedies prior to bringing suits regarding “prison conditions” to 
federal court.81    
Exhaustion of administrative remedies requires parties to avail themselves of all 
potential solutions within the appropriate agency before asking the court to make a 
decision “on an adverse administrative determination.”82  When enacting the PLRA, 
Congress required exhaustion because it precludes the federal judiciary from 
intruding on a prison’s administrative process until it has reached a solution.83  Also, 
exhaustion allows prison administrations to apply their expertise and discretion, 
cultivate factual records, and perhaps, settle prisoner conflicts without judicial 
involvement.84  
Keeping these attributes of exhaustion in mind, Congress made three significant 
changes to the exhaustion requirement.  First, section 1997e(a) now requires a 
prisoner to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court, 
whereas, prior to the PLRA, the federal judiciary used its discretion in applying the 
                                                                
7828 U.S.C. § 1915(g).  Section 1915(g) was more commonly known as “three strikes 
rule.”  In addition to an amendment that requires all inmates to pay the court’s filing fee, 
section 1915(g) was created to deter prisoners from repeatedly filing frivolous complaints.   
Joseph T. Lukens, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: Three Strikes and You’re Out of Court – 
It May Be Effective, But is it Constitutional?, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 471, 471 (1997).   
Prior to the enactment of the PLRA, federal courts were extremely concerned by the 
amount of frivolous litigation filed by specific prisoners.  Recall the Scher case in which Judge 
Limbaugh announced his disapproval with “frequent filer[s] of prisoner civil rights suits.”  
Scher v. Purkett, 758 F. Supp. at 1316, 1316-17 (E.D. Mo. 1991), aff’d, 62 F.3d 1421 (8th Cir. 
1995). 
7928 U.S.C. § 1932.   
8028 U.S.C. § 1915(b). 
8142 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  Section 1997e (a) states “No action shall 
be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other 
Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such 
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”  Id. 
825 JACOB A. STEIN ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 49.01, at 49-3 (2001); Myers v. 
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938) (“No one is entitled to judicial 
relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been 
exhausted.”). 
83See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992) (suggesting that agencies should 
have the chance to correct disputes before the courts take over); McKart v. United States, 395 
U.S. 185, 193 (1969) (“A primary purpose [of the exhaustion requirement] is, of course, the 
avoidance of premature interruption of the administrative process.”); accord 141 CONG. REC. 
26,554 (1995) (“In many jurisdictions . . . judicial orders entered under Federal law have 
effectively turned control of the prison systems away from elected officials accountable to the 
taxpayer, and over to the courts.”). 
84See McKart, 395 U.S. at 194; STEIN ET AL., supra note 82, at 49-3.  
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exhaustion requirement.85  The second change requires exhaustion of all federal 
claims.86  Prior to the enactment of the PLRA, section 1997e(a) applied only to 
actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.87  After enactment, however, the 
exhaustion requirement applied to “all other Federal laws.”88  In enacting this 
change, Congress sought to deter all frivolous lawsuits, not just those filed under 
section 1983.89  The third change limited the scope of section 1997e(a) by only 
requiring exhaustion when prisoners’ brought actions “with respect to prison 
conditions.”90  Because Congress failed to define “prison conditions” in section 
1997e, conflict and confusion have arisen regarding the applicability of section 
1997e(a) to excessive force actions.91   
III.  THE CONFLICT AMONG THE FEDERAL COURTS 
Congress failed to define the phrase “prison conditions” in section 1997e(a).  As 
a result, the circuits are split as to whether excessive force claims are subject to the 
exhaustion requirement.92  Because the term “prison conditions” is only defined in 18 
                                                                
85Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) with 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1) 
(1994).  In general, courts do not require plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies prior to 
filing a civil suit in federal court.  See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 507-08 
(1982).  However, because prisoner-plaintiffs are different than law-abiding citizens, the 
PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies before entering court.  See id.   
8642 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
8742 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1) (1994).  Section 1997e(a)(1) states: 
Subject to the provisions of paragraph (2), in any action brought pursuant to section 
1979 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C. §1983) by an adult 
convicted of a crime confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, the 
court shall, if the court believes that such a requirement would be appropriate and in 
the interests of justice, continue such case for a period of not to exceed ninety days in 
order to require exhaustion of such plain, speedy, and effective administrative 
remedies as are available. 
Id. 
8842 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
89141 CONG. REC. 14,573 (1995). 
90Compare § 1997e(a) (1994 & Supp. V 2000) with § 1997e(a)(1) (1994). 
91See supra note 11. 
92Compare Smith v. Zachary, 255 F.3d 446, 452 (7th Cir. 2001), Higginbottom v. Carter, 
223 F.3d 1259, 1260 (11th Cir. 2000), Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 644 (6th Cir. 1999), 
Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 299 (3d Cir. 2000), aff’d on other grounds, 532 U.S. 731 
(2001), Wendell v. Asher, 162 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 1998), and Garrett v. Hawk, 127 F.3d 
1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 1997) (requiring exhaustion), with Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 106 
(2d Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom, Porter, 532 U.S. at 1065 (finding exhaustion not 
required). 
There are some notable district court cases also.  Compare Serrano v. Alvarado, 169 F. 
Supp. 2d 14, 16 (D.P.R. 2001), Castillo v. Buday, 85 F. Supp. 2d 309, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), 
Johnson v. Garraghty, 57 F. Supp. 2d 321, 326-28 (E.D. Va. 1999), Beeson v. Fishkill Corr. 
Facility, 28 F. Supp. 2d 884, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), and Moore v. Smith, 18 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 
1363 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (finding exhaustion required), with Giannattasio v. Artuz, No. 97 Civ. 
7606, 2000 WL 335242, at *11-*12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2000), Wright v. Dee, 54 F. Supp. 2d 
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss1/8
2002-03] TO EXHAUST OR NOT TO EXHAUST? 141 
U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2), the Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have used 
section 3626(g)(2) to categorize excessive force as a “prison condition.”93  These 
Circuits have required prisoner litigants, claiming excessive force, to exhaust 
administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court.94  The Second Circuit, 
however, disagrees with this approach, and uses the structure, purpose, and 
legislative history of the PLRA to find that excessive force is not a “prison 
condition.”95  In Nussle v. Willette, the Second Circuit held that excessive force 
claims are not subject to the administrative exhaustion requirement.96  In response to 
the apparent conflict among the circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the 
case Porter v. Nussle.97   
A.  The Third, Sixth and Seventh Circuits Require Exhaustion 
1.  Freeman v. Francis 
In Freeman v. Francis,98 the plaintiff brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 claiming that he sustained a shoulder injury after an assault by a corrections 
officer.99  The plaintiff argued that an excessive force claim was not subject to the 
exhaustion requirement because excessive force claims are not encompassed by the 
term “prison conditions” as used in section 1997e(a).100  The Sixth Circuit rejected 
this argument and held that excessive force claims are subject to 1997e(a)’s 
exhaustion requirement.101 
The Sixth Circuit gave three particular reasons for requiring exhaustion.  First, 
the court indicated that “prison conditions” was not defined in section 1997e(a), but 
was defined in another section of the PLRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3626.102  This section states 
                                                          
199, 205-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), Baskerville v. Goord, No. 97 Civ. 6413, 1998 WL 778396, at 
*2-*5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 1998), White v. Fauver, 19 F. Supp. 2d 305, 316 (D.N.J. 1998), 
Johnson v. O’Malley, No. 96 Civ. 6598, 1998 WL 292421, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 19, 1998), and 
Morgan v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corr., 976 F. Supp. 892, 895-96 (D. Az. 1997) (finding exhaustion 
not required). 
93Smith, 255 F.3d at 452; Higginbottom, 223 F.3d at 1260; Freeman, 196 F.3d at 644; 
Booth, 206 F.3d at 299. 
94See Smith, 255 F.3d at 453; Higginbottom, 223 F.3d at 1261; Freeman, 196 F.3d at 644; 
Booth, 206 F.3d at 298.  The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have held that excessive force actions 
are subject to the exhaustion requirements of section 1997e(a) without supplying in depth 
discussions behind their conclusions.  See Wendell, 162 F.3d at 889, 891-92; Garrett, 127 F.3d 
at 1264-66. 
95Nussle, 224 F.3d at 97-106. 
96Id. at 106. 
97Porter v. Nussle, 532 U.S. 1065 (2001). 
98196 F.3d at 641. 
99Id. at 642-43.  
100Id. at 643.  
101Id. at 644.  
102Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 643-44 (6th Cir. 1999).  
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that claims regarding “prison conditions” are “any civil proceeding ... with respect to 
conditions of confinement or the effects of actions by government officials on the 
lives of confined persons.”103  The Sixth Circuit applied the second part of the 
statute, the part following “or,” and found that claims of excessive force are “prison 
conditions” and thus, are subject to the exhaustion requirement of section 
1997e(a).104 
Next, the court articulated that the purpose of the PLRA also supports the 
conclusion that the phrase “prison conditions” includes excessive force claims.105  
The PLRA was enacted to help deter prisoners from filing frivolous lawsuits, as well 
as to reduce the federal courts’ micromanagement over prison systems.106  The 
exhaustion requirement furthers these two purposes.  First, exhaustion requires 
prisoners to submit their complaints to the prison’s administration.107  This process 
helps eliminate the frivolous lawsuits before they have the possibility of reaching 
court.108  Second, the exhaustion requirement gives prison administrations the power 
to render decisions regarding prisoner complaints.109  This process gives a prison a 
chance to correct problems before a complaint reaches federal court.110  
Consequently, the power to run the prisons is reverted back to the prison 
administrations.   
Third, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that a Supreme Court case, decided before the 
PLRA was enacted, already held that excessive force claims are included as “prison 
conditions.”111  In McCarthy v. Bronson, 112 the Supreme Court held that the statutory 
language “prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement” includes both 
continuous practices and individual acts of wrongdoing, such as a claim of assault.113  
By using the Supreme Court’s decision in McCarthy, the Sixth Circuit concluded 
that if the “conditions of confinement” language was enough for McCarthy to 
encompass excessive force claims, then surely the definition of “prison 
conditions”—“effects of actions by government officials”—includes claims of 
excessive force.114  The court reasoned that a plain reading of the definition of 
“prison conditions” more closely relates to individual acts of wrongdoing than 
“conditions of confinement.”115  Therefore, if the term “conditions of confinement” 
                                                                
10342 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  
104Freeman, 196 F.3d at 644.  
105Id.   
106Id. 
107Id. 
108See Freeman, 196 F.3d at 644. 
109Id. 
110Id. 
111Id.  
112500 U.S. 136 (1991).  
113Id. at 139-43. 
114See Freeman, 196 F.3d at 644. 
115Id. 
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includes individual acts of excessive force, then surely the term “prison conditions” 
encompasses excessive force claims.116 
2.  Booth v. Churner 
In Booth v. Churner, 117 the Third Circuit followed the Sixth Circuit and held that 
excessive force claims are “prison conditions” as used in section 1997e(a).118  Like 
the Sixth Circuit in Freeman, the Third Circuit relied on the statutory definition of 
“prison conditions” in section 3636 of the PLRA.119  Also, like Freeman, the court 
relied on McCarthy v. Bronson.120  Booth, however, also rebutted an argument that 
the Supreme Court concluded that the term “prison conditions” does not include 
excessive force claims.121 
In Booth, the plaintiff argued that the court should follow the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Farmer v. Brennan122 and Hudson v. McMillian.123  The plaintiff claimed 
that in these two cases, the Supreme Court treated “prison conditions” claims and 
excessive force claims differently, and if Congress intended to eliminate the 
distinction between “prison conditions” and excessive force claims it would have 
done so in the PLRA.124  The Third Circuit found this argument flawed for a number 
of reasons.  First, Congress made its intent clear regarding the definition of “prison 
conditions” in section 3626.125  Therefore, applying the common law meaning of 
“conditions of confinement” is unnecessary and inappropriate.126  Second, the Third 
Circuit argued that applying Farmer and Hudson is inappropriate because courts 
determine Congress’ intent in enacting the statute, not the intent of the Supreme 
Court in interpreting similar, but not identical terms.127  For all these reasons, the 
Third Circuit in Booth concluded that claims of excessive force are encompassed by 
the term “prison conditions” and therefore, must be administratively exhausted.128    
                                                                
116Id. 
117Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 290 (3d Cir. 2000), aff’d on other grounds, 532 U.S. 
731 (2001).  
118Id. 
119Id. at 294-95.  
120Id. at 295-96.  
121Id. at 297-98.  
122511 U.S. 825 (1994). 
123503 U.S. 1 (1992).  
124Booth, 206 F.3d at 297.   
125Id. 
126Id. at 297.  
127Id. 
128Booth, 206 F.3d at 290. 
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3.  Smith v. Zachary 
In Smith v. Zachary, the Seventh Circuit took a more defensive approach in 
reaching its conclusion that excessive force claims are included as “prison 
conditions.”  In Smith, the plaintiff argued that since in section 1997e(a) the word 
“conditions” is plural, it does not include an individual event such as an assault.129  
The court quickly rebutted this claim by quoting the opening section of the United 
States Code: “[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the 
context indicates otherwise ... words importing the plural include the singular.”130  
The court also noted, “[g]iven that part of a prison guard’s job is to control inmates, 
the use of excessive force in achieving this end can be viewed as a management 
failure, not only as a random act of violence.”131  Hence, the court concluded that 
claims of excessive force are encompassed by the term “prisons conditions” because 
the use of excessive force can be the result of an ongoing condition at the prison.132 
The Seventh Circuit also rebutted the prisoners’ assertions by pointing out the 
positive attributes of the exhaustion requirement.  First, the court noted that requiring 
excessive force claims to be administratively exhausted allows prisons to address 
problems internally, as well as to insure the prisoner’s safety more quickly.133  Also, 
the court indicated that after a prisoner exhausts administrative remedies, the 
prisoner has a factual record to take with him if he chooses to file in federal court.134  
Finally, the court observed that the exhaustion requirement does not bar a prisoner 
from filing suit in federal court.135  Instead, the exhaustion requirement only creates a 
necessary prerequisite.136  For all these reasons, the court concluded that the 
exhaustion requirement could help prisoners, rather than hurt them.137 
The Seventh Circuit made additional observations before rendering its final 
judgment.  The court noticed that even though the Supreme Court in Booth v. 
Churner did not address the excessive force issue specifically, the Court required the 
prisoner’s claim of excessive force to be administratively exhausted.138  The Seventh 
Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court, by dismissing the case prior to 
determining the issue of excessive force, implied that excessive force claims are 
subject to the exhaustion requirement. 139  Finally, the Seventh Circuit addressed the 
plaintiff’s suggestion that excessive force claims should be an exception to the 
                                                                
129Smith v. Zachary, 255 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2001). 
130Id. at 449. 
131Id. 
132Id. 
133Smith, 255 F.3d at 450-51. 
134Id. at 451. 
135Id. 
136Id. 
137Smith, 255 F.3d at 451. 
138Id. at 452. 
139Id. 
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exhaustion requirement.140  The court quickly turned down this suggestion by stating 
“an exception for particularized instances of force directed at a specific inmate ... is a 
cumbersome test to apply.”141  After making these final observations, the Seventh 
Circuit concluded that claims of excessive force are “prison conditions” and thus, 
must be administratively exhausted.142    
B.  The Second Circuit Does Not Require Exhaustion 
The Second Circuit, in Nussle v. Willette, put a kink in what seemed to be a 
consensus among the circuits.  In Nussle, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit against two 
corrections officers alleging excessive use of physical force under the Eighth 
Amendment.143  The Second Circuit held that the plaintiff’s excessive force claim 
was not subject to the exhaustion requirement of 1997e(a).144 
The Second Circuit discussed five specific reasons for not requiring excessive 
force claims to be administratively exhausted.  First, the court looked to the statutory 
text of section 1997e(a) to determine the meaning of the phrase “prison conditions.”  
Even though “prison conditions” is not defined anywhere in section 1997, the court 
stated that the text itself suggests that particular instances of excessive force are 
included as “prison conditions.”145  “The use of the term prison conditions” in section 
1997e(a) would appear to refer to “circumstances affecting everyone in the area 
affected by them, rather than ‘single or momentary matters,’ such as beatings or 
assaults, that are directed at particular individuals.”146  The court reasoned that a 
claim of excessive force is a singular event directed at one prisoner, while the term 
“prison conditions” refers to ongoing practices that affect a number of prisoners.147  
Therefore, the Second Circuit concluded, excessive force claims are not 
encompassed by the term “prison conditions.”148 
Second, the court refused to use section 3626 to define the phrase “prison 
conditions.”  The court argued, “effects of actions by government officials on the 
lives of persons confined in prison,” is such an awkward phrase that ordinarily it 
would not be used to depict events of excessive force.149  The court reasoned that no 
one would use this roundabout terminology to describe an altercation with a prison 
guard.150  As a result, the Second Circuit concluded that by using this language, 
                                                                
140Id. at 451. 
141Smith, 255 F.3d at 451. 
142Id. at 452. 
143Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom, Porter v. 
Nussle, 532 U.S. 1065 (2001). 
144Id. at 106. 
145Id. at 101. 
146Id. 
147Nussle, 224 F.3d at 101. 
148Id. at 105. 
149Id. at 102. 
150Id. at 103. 
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Congress demonstrated its intention that claims of excessive force are not included 
as “prison conditions.”151  
Third, the Second Circuit articulated that the structure, purpose and legislative 
history of the PLRA suggest that excessive force claims are not subject to the 
exhaustion requirement of section 1997e(a).  The court first suggested that the 
definition of “prison conditions” in section 3626 does not apply to section 
1997e(a).152  The court reasoned that Congress had different intentions in enacting 
these two provisions.  By enacting section 3626, Congress was concerned with 
preventing courts from interfering with prison administrations.153  On the other hand, 
by enacting section 1997e(a), Congress was concerned with the purpose of “filtering 
out frivolous suits administratively.”154  Because the two statutes serve different 
purposes, Congress could not have intended to apply the same meaning of “prison 
conditions” to section 1997e(a).155  Such an application, would promote an entirely 
different purpose than Congress intended for section 1997e(a).156 
Fourth, the Second Circuit reasoned that “government officials,” as used in 
section 3626(g)(2), is more reasonably understood to apply to administrative 
officials, rather than corrections officers or prison employees.157  The court 
maintained that the term “officials” refers to policymaking officials, and not 
employees, such as corrections officers.158  The court explained that corrections 
officers have day-to-day contact with inmates, but have no authority to make 
administrative decisions.159  Because corrections officers have no authority to make 
administrative decisions they are not “government officials.”160  Therefore, the court 
determined, section 3626(g)(2)’s definition of “prison conditions” cannot apply 
when a prison guard commits an assault.161 
Fifth, the Second Circuit relied on two Supreme Court cases that were decided 
prior to the enactment of the PLRA.  In Hudson v. McMillian162 and Farmer v. 
Brennan,163 the Supreme Court created a distinction between excessive force claims 
and “conditions-of-confinement” claims.  The Supreme Court reasoned, 
                                                                
151Nussle, 244 F.3d at 103. 
152Id. 
153Id. at 103-04. 
154Id. at 103. 
155Nussle, 244 F.3d at 103-04. 
156Id. 
157Id. at 104-05. 
158Id. at 104. 
159Nussle, 244 F.3d at 104. 
160Id. 
161Id. 
162503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).  
163511 U.S. 825, 835-36 (1994). 
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“contemporary standards of decency are violated” by a malicious use of force.164  
Whereas, “conditions of confinement” claims are only “deprivations denying the 
minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities.”165  Hence, a less rigorous showing 
of injury is required for claims of excessive force, than for “conditions of 
confinement” claims.166  The Second Circuit used the Supreme Court’s analysis and 
determined that the term “prison conditions” is substantially related to the term 
“conditions of confinement.”167  Therefore, excessive force claims should not be 
defined as “prison conditions” and thus, should not be required to be administratively 
exhausted.168 
Because the Second Circuit has refused to follow the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, 
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits in holding that excessive force claims are subject to the 
exhaustion requirement, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Porter v. Nussle.169  
The Supreme Court’s decision in this case is likely to have a substantial effect not 
only on prisoners’ excessive force claims, but also on other similar and controversial 
prisoner claims, such as unlawful strip searches, sexual assault by prison guards, 
unconstitutional denials of medical care, unjustified punishment and retaliation, or 
even a failure to provide protection from assault committed by other prisoners.170 
IV.  THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT INCLUDES EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIMS 
Prisoners claiming excessive force should be required to exhaust all 
administrative remedies for a couple of reasons.  First, the plain meaning of the 
statute suggests an intent to include claims of excessive force in the exhaustion 
requirement.  Although the term “prison conditions” is not defined in section 
1997e(a), section 3626 of the PLRA provides a definition of “prison conditions” and 
this definition includes claims of excessive force.  Additionally, the purpose and 
legislative history of 1997e(a) supports exhaustion of excessive force claims.  
Congress made the purposes of the PLRA clear: to reduce frivolous prisoner 
litigation, to prevent the federal judiciary from micromanaging prison systems, and 
to lessen the burden on the federal docket.171  Requiring exhaustion for excessive 
force claims furthers these three purposes.  Also, two Supreme Court decisions, 
McCarthy v. Bronson and Booth v. Churner, add to the view that the PLRA’s 
exhaustion requirement includes claims of excessive force.  Moreover, requiring 
exhaustion of excessive force claims is the most efficient and effective process for 
prisoners as well as prison systems and the federal judiciary.  For all these reasons, 
                                                                
164Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. 
165Id.  
166Id.  
167Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom, Porter v. 
Nussle, 532 U.S. 1065 (2001). 
168Id. 
169Porter v. Nussle, 532 U.S. 1065 (2001). 
170See Beeson v. Fishkill Corr. Facility, 28 F. Supp. 2d 884, 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).  
171141 CONG. REC. 26, 548 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. 35,980 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. 26,554 
(1995); 141 CONG. REC. 26,448 (1995). 
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prisoners claiming excessive force should be required to exhaust all administrative 
remedies before filing suit in federal court.   
A.  The Definition of “Prison Conditions” Includes the Use of Excessive Force 
In applying section 3626(g)(2) to section 1997e(a), one can easily conclude that 
Congress intended to include excessive force claims as “prison conditions,” thereby 
requiring such claims to be administratively exhausted.  First, excessive force claims 
are necessarily encompassed by the term “prison conditions.”  Congress created 
roundabout phraseology—“effects of actions by government officials on the lives of 
persons confined in prisons”172—capturing an extensive variety of practices, such as 
the use of excessive force.  Additionally, the compelling evidence of Congressional 
intent also supports the application of section 3626 to define the term “prison 
conditions” as used in section 1997e(a).  There is no reason to believe that when 
Congress enacted the PLRA it meant the term “prison conditions” to mean one thing 
in section 3626 and to mean something totally different in the following section. 
Also, the similarities in the statutory language of sections 3626 and 1997 illustrate 
Congress’ intent to use section 3626 to define “prison conditions” as used in section 
1997e(a).  For these reasons, one can safely assume that the definition of “prison 
conditions” in section 3626(g)(2) necessarily defines the term “prison conditions” as 
used in section 1997e(a), and by doing so, requires excessive force claims to be 
administratively exhausted.   
The phrase “action ... with respect to prison conditions”173 is not defined 
anywhere in section 1997e(a).  A definition of this phrase, however, is provided in 
18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2), which was also enacted as part of the PLRA.  Section 
3626(g)(2) provides that the phrase:  
“civil action with respect to prison conditions” means any civil 
proceeding arising under Federal law with respect to the conditions of 
confinement or the effects of actions by government officials on the lives 
of persons confined in prison, but does not include habeas corpus 
proceedings challenging the fact or duration of confinement in prison[.]174 
According to the rule on statutory construction, when Congress uses the same 
term in two different places of the same statute, those terms should be interpreted to 
have similar meanings.175  Accordingly, in order to determine if excessive force 
claims are subject to the exhaustion requirement of 1997e(a), one should follow the 
                                                                
17218 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2). 
17342 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1994 & Supp. V. 1999). 
17418 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2). 
175Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 260 (1993) (“We certainly agree with 
petitioners that language used in one portion of a statute . . . should be deemed to have the 
same meaning as the same language used elsewhere in the statute.”); Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 
U.S. 478, 484 (1990) (quoting Sorenson v. Sec’y of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986)) 
(“The substantial relation between the two programs presents a classic case for application of 
the ‘normal rule of statutory construction that identical words used in different parts of the 
same act are intended to have the same meaning.’”); Baggett v. First Nat’l Bank of 
Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342, 1350 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Well-established canon of statutory 
construction [is] that words have the same meaning throughout a given statute.”). 
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rules governing statutory construction and look to section 3626(g)(2) to determine 
the meaning of “prison conditions.”176   
By applying 3626(g)(2) to section 1997e(a), one can easily conclude that 
Congress intended to include excessive force claims as “prison conditions.”  Courts 
have routinely separated section 3626(g)(2) into two prongs: (1) any action “with 
respect to the conditions of confinement;” or (2) “the effects of actions by 
government officials on the lives of persons confined in prison.”177  As the Third 
Circuit in Booth pointed out, the “conditions of confinement” language includes 
complaints regarding “the environment in which the prisoners live, the physical 
conditions of that environment, and the nature of the services provided therein.”178  
Therefore, claims of excessive force do not “naturally fall into” the first prong of 
section 3626(g)(2).179 
One can argue, however, that the second prong of 3626(g)(2) encompasses 
claims of excessive force.  This prong defines “prison conditions” as “the effects of 
actions by government officials on the lives of persons confined in prison.”180  The 
use of excessive force on a prisoner is an action by a government official: correction 
officers are governmental employees who run the day-to-day aspects of a prison, 
such as protecting prisoners from each other and controlling the order of the prison 
as a whole.181  Therefore, a correction officer is a government official.182  Moreover, 
the use of excessive force by a prison guard unavoidably has an effect on the life of a 
prisoner.  As the court in Booth suggested, excessive force makes a prisoner’s life 
worse in the same way as intentionally denying “a prisoner inmate food, heating or 
medical attention.”183  For these reasons, excessive force claims are necessarily 
encompassed by the term “prison conditions,” and as a result, must be 
administratively exhausted as required by section 1997e(a).  
Despite the logic of this argument, the Second Circuit refused to accept that 
excessive force claims are defined by section 3626(g)(2), because “such awkward 
language would not, ordinarily, be used to describe such incidents.”184  Specifically, 
the court cited Judge Noonan’s argument in Booth that when someone is assaulted, 
“no one on earth, educated or uneducated, would use such roundabout phraseology” 
as “effects of actions by government officials on the lives of persons confined in 
                                                                
176Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 297-98 (3d Cir. 2000), aff’d on other grounds, 532 
U.S. 731 (2001); Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 644 (6th Cir. 1999). 
177See Smith v. Zachary, 255 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 2001); Booth, 206 F.3d at 295. 
178Booth, 206 F.3d at 294-95. 
179Id. 
18042 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2). 
181See Smith, 255 F.3d at 449; Booth, 206 F.3d at 295. 
182Booth, 206 F.3d at 295.  
183Id. 
184Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom, Porter v. 
Nussle, 532 U.S. 1065 (2001). 
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prison” to express the nature of the assault.185  This argument is impracticable and 
unsubstantiated.  Judge’s Noonan’s argument works with all types of prisoner 
lawsuits, even the frivolous kind.  When someone is served chunky peanut butter 
instead of creamy, no one would describe this situation as an “effect[] of action[] by 
government officials on the lives of persons confined in jail.”186  Congress knew 
what it was doing when it used a general phrase to define “prison conditions.”187  If 
Congress wanted to exclude acts of excessive force, it could have clarified its intent 
by creating a more precise description of “prison conditions.”188  But Congress did 
not do that.  Instead, Congress created a roundabout phrase that would encompass an 
extensive variety of practices, such as the use of excessive force.189   
The Second Circuit also maintained that excessive force claims do not fall into 
the second category of section 3636(g)(2) because prison guards are not government 
officials.190  The court defended its narrow interpretation of section 3626 by pointing 
to Congress’ primary purpose in enacting section 3626.191  In enacting section 3626 
of the PLRA, Congress sought to prevent the judiciary from interfering with the 
management of prison systems and to return to prison administrators the authority to 
make the day-to-day decisions.192  Therefore, the court concluded, the term 
“government officials” as used in section 3626 only applies to high-ranking prison 
officials or “administrative and policymaking officials” and not “lower level 
government employees, such as corrections officers[.]”193   
Once again, the Second Circuit mistakenly has taken a narrow approach 
regarding section 3626(g)(2).  If Congress wanted to limit the application to 
administrative or policymaking officials, it would have done so by specifically 
limiting the provision to “policymaking officials,” as it did in 50 U.S.C. § 403-
3(b)(5), or by limiting the provision to a “supervisory official,” as it did in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2705(a)(1)(B) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-11(a)(4).194  Congress, however, did not 
                                                                
185Id. at 103 (quoting Judge Noonan in Booth, 206 F.3d at 302 (Noonan, J., concurring and 
dissenting)).  
186See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 23, Porter v. 
Nussle, 532 U.S. 1065 (2002) (No. 00-853). 
187Id. 
188Id. 
189Id.  
190Nussle, 224 F.3d at 104. 
191Id.  
192Id. at 103-04. 
193Id. at 104. 
194See 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(b)(5) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(1)(B) (1994 
& Supp. V 1999); 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-11(a)(4) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
 
50 U.S.C. § 403-3(b)(5) states: 
The Director shall make available to the Council such staff as may be necessary to 
permit the Council to carry out its responsibilities under this subsection and shall take 
appropriate measures to ensure that the Council and its staff satisfy the needs of 
policymaking officials and other consumers of intelligence.  The Council shall also be 
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limit the provision by using the terms “policymaking officials” or “supervisory 
officials.”  Instead, Congress broadened the provision by using the more general 
term “government officials.”195  Therefore, the Second Circuit’s argument that 
section 3626(g)(2) does not apply to excessive force claims because corrections 
officers are not “government officials” is impracticable and unpersuasive.196   
The compelling evidence of congressional intent also supports the application of 
section 3626 to define the term “prison conditions” as used in section 1997e(a).  
Because “prison conditions” is not defined in section 1997e(a), the close proximity 
of section 3626 to section 1997 in the PLRA supports the conclusion that the 
definition of “actions with respects to prison conditions” was intended to apply to 
section 1997e(a).197  In the PLRA, section 3626 immediately precedes section 
1997.198  Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that when Congress enacted the 
PLRA, it meant the term “prison conditions” to mean one thing in section 3626 and 
to mean something totally different in the following section.199   
Also, the similarities between sections 3626 and 1997 illustrate Congress’ intent 
to use section 3626 to define “prison conditions” as used in 1997e(a).  Both sections 
were amended on the same day and as part of the same legislation.200  Additionally, 
                                                          
readily accessible to policymaking officials and other appropriate individuals not 
otherwise associated with the intelligence community. 
Id. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(1)(B) states: 
[W]here an administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal or State statute or a 
Federal or State grand jury subpoena is obtained, delay the notifiication required under 
section 2703(b) of this title for a period not to exceed ninety days upon the execution 
of a written certification of a supervisory official that there is reason to believe that 
notification of the existence of the subpoena may have an adverse result described in 
paragraph (2) of this subsection. 
Id. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-11(a)(4) states: 
[A] requirement that an application of a warrant to conduct a search governed by this 
title be approved by an attorney for the government, except that in an emergency 
situation the application may be approved by another appropriate supervisory official 
if within 24 hours of such emergency the appropriate United States Attorney is 
notified.   
Id. 
195See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2). 
196The Supreme Court routinely referring to corrections officers as “officials” also 
supports this conclusion.  See McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 138 (1991); Hudson v. 
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992).  Even more compelling is the fact that the Supreme Court 
has also referred to corrections officers as “government officials.”  See Procunier v. Navarette, 
434 U.S. 555, 558 n.2 (1978); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 587 (1998).  
197Brief for Petitioners at 21, Porter v. Nussle, 532 U.S. 1065 (2001) (No. 00-853). 
198See Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 802-03, 110 Stat. 
1321-66 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626); Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. 
L. No. 104-134, § 803, 110 Stat. 1321-70 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997). 
199See Brief for Petitioners at 21, Porter, 532 U.S. at 1065 (No. 00-853) (quoting Comm’r 
v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 250 (1996). 
200See Smith v. Zachary, 255 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2001).  
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both 3626 and 1997 address the solutions and limitations of prisoner litigation.201  
Moreover, as the court in Smith v. Zachary indicated, “[b]oth sections are devoted to 
various aspects of prison litigation, including: settlement agreements, the 
appointment of special masters, attorneys’ fees awards, the use of telephonic 
hearings, waiver, and limitations on recovery.”202  All these similarities suggest that 
Congress intended the courts to use section 3626(g)(2) to define the term “prison 
conditions” as used in section 1997e(a). 
The most compelling similarity between sections 1997e(a) and 3626(g)(2), 
however, is that both provisions share the same objective; to deter the federal 
judiciary from intervening in the prison systems’ administrative duties.  The Second 
Circuit in Nussle argued that while section 1997e(a) is concerned with “filtering out 
frivolous suits administratively, before they get to court,” section 3626(g)(2) is 
“concerned with the different purpose of preventing courts from micromanaging 
prison systems.”203  This argument is not persuasive.  Section 1997e(a) requires 
inmates to use the prison system’s agencies to address their concerns before filing 
suit in federal court.204  This exhaustion requirement keeps the federal judiciary from 
becoming involved in the administrative processes of the prison until the prison has a 
chance to resolve the prisoners’ grievances.205  Also, the exhaustion requirement 
gives back to prison administrators the ability to decide matters of routine prison 
administration.206  Therefore, because section 1997e(a) also seeks to prevent judicial 
interference, there is strong evidence that the Second Circuit misinterpreted the 
section when it stated “sections 3626(g)(2) and 1997e(a) advance distinct statutory 
purposes.”207 
Even if section 3626(g)(2) did not define “prison conditions,” the plain meaning 
of section 1997e(a) suggests that excessive force claims are included in the term 
“prison conditions” and thus, must be administratively exhausted.  The Second 
Circuit in Nussle argued that the plural form of the word “conditions” as used in 
section 1997e(a) could not denote a single, isolated event such as assault.208  Instead 
the word “conditions” signifies “attendant circumstances” or “existing state of 
affairs.”209  This argument is flawed for a number of reasons.  First, noting the 
distinction between plural and singular words is not a commonly used practice of 
                                                                
201Id. at 448-49. 
202Id. at 449. 
203Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 103-04 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom, Porter v. 
Nussle, 532 U.S. 1065 (2001). 
20442 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 
205See Prieser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973). 
206See Prieser, 411 U.S. at 492 (“[B]ecause most potential litigation involving . . . 
prisoners arises on a day-to-day basis, it is most efficiently and properly handled by the 
[prison’s] administrative bodies.”). 
207Nussle, 224 F.3d at 103. 
208Id. at 101. 
209Id. (relying on the definition of “conditions” located at WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 473 (1961)). 
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statutory interpretation.210  The United States Code, where section 1997e(a) is 
located, expressly states “[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, 
unless the context indicates otherwise ... words importing the plural include the 
singular.”211  Applying this rule of construction, one can safely assume that Congress 
intended the plural form of  “prison conditions” to apply to a singular event such as 
assault.   
Second, it is not clear that assault claims arise out of a “single or momentary” 
event.  Instead, the nature of an assault by a prison guard suggests that there are 
problems within the prison’s management system.212  As the court in Smith v. 
Zachary indicated, “[a]n assault by a prison guard could be a by-product of 
systematic problems, including poor hiring practices, insufficient training and 
supervision, or an inadequate procedure for responding to prison riots or 
insubordinate behavior by prisoners.”213  When examining the term “prison 
conditions” in the context of a correctional institution, it is apparent that there is no 
distinction between the plural form and the singular form of the word “conditions.”214  
Therefore, it is clear from the plain meaning of section 1997e(a) that claims of 
excessive force are included in the term “prison conditions” and thus, must be 
administratively exhausted.   
B.  The Purpose and Legislative History of 1997e(a) Supports Exhaustion of 
Excessive Force Claims 
Not only does the definition of “prison conditions” and the plain meaning of 
section 1997e(a) suggest that excessive force claims must be administratively 
exhausted, but the purpose and legislative history of the PLRA illustrates Congress’ 
intention to require exhaustion of excessive force claims.  The general rule on 
statutory interpretation requires an interpreter to first rely on plain text to determine 
the meaning and purpose of a statute.215  Then, if the statute is ambiguous, an 
interpreter can look to the statute’s legislative history.216   Despite the apparent 
clarity of the term “prison conditions,” some courts have consulted the legislative 
                                                                
210Smith v. Zachary, 255 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, 
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:34 (6th ed. 2000)). 
2111 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
212Smith, 255 F.3d at 449. 
213Id. 
214Id. 
215See Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 271 (2000) (“In analyzing a statute, we begin 
by examining the text, not by ‘psychoanalyzing those who enacted it.’”); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 
U.S. 471, 476 (1994) (“In the absence of such a definition, we construe a statutory term in 
accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning.”); Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 
249, 253-54 (1992) (“We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a 
legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”); John 
Paul Stevens, The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1373, 
1374 (1992) (stating that the first step in statutory interpretation is to read the statute).   
216See McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 139 (1991); Crandon v. United States, 494 
U.S. 152, 158 (1990) (interpreting a statute also requires courts to look to the “object and 
policy” of the statute). 
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history of the PLRA.217  Yet, the purpose and legislative history of the PLRA also 
support the conclusion that Congress intended the exhaustion requirement to 
encompass excessive force claims.   
1.  Congress’ Purpose of Deterring Frivolous Prisoner Litigation Requires 
Exhaustion 
By requiring exhaustion, Congress intended, in part, to reduce the number of 
frivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners.218  Because excessive force claims can also be 
frivolous, Congress must have intended these claims be exhausted as well.219  
Prisoners can allege they were exposed to malicious nudges, 220 or that a loud 
reprimand by a prison guard is an unnecessary use of force.  The prisoner could even 
claim an offensive glance by a prison guard is harassment.221  The possibilities of 
frivolous excessive force claims are infinite.222  Therefore, allowing an excessive 
force exception to the exhaustion requirement would undermine Congress’ intention 
of reducing the number of frivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners.223  
Congress’ use of statistical studies also demonstrates its intent to include 
excessive force claims in the exhaustion requirement.  Congress used statistical 
studies to support its claim that most prisoner lawsuits are frivolous and burdensome 
upon the federal judiciary.224  These studies made no distinction between excessive 
force claims and other conditions of confinement claims.225  By failing to make this 
distinction, Congress projected its view that any federal law claim has the potential 
to be frivolous.226  Thus, in order to reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits, it is 
reasonable to conclude that Congress required all federal claims, including excessive 
force claims, to be administratively exhausted. 
Moreover, creating an exception for excessive force claims would frustrate 
Congress’ goal of reducing the federal judiciary’s burden of prisoner litigation.  
Commentators that refuse to require exhaustion believe that a distinction should be 
made between excessive force claims resulting from ongoing conditions, and 
excessive force claims resulting from specific acts of alleged misconduct.227  This 
approach, however, would generate an additional amount of work for the district 
                                                                
217See Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 103-06 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom, 
Porter v. Nussle, 532 U.S. 1065 (2001). 
218See discussion supra Part II.B. 
219See Smith v. Zachary, 255 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 2001). 
220Id. at 452. 
221Id. 
222Id. 
223Id. 
224See 141 CONG. REC. 26,548 (1995). 
225See id. 
226Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom, Porter v. 
Nussle, 532 U.S. 1065 (2001). 
227See Willette, 244 F.3d at 102-03. 
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courts.228  Courts would first have to determine if claims of excessive force are 
ongoing conditions or single acts of misconduct.229  Because this distinction would 
be difficult to recognize, unnecessary prisoner litigation would continually burden 
the federal judiciary.230   
2.  Exhaustion Furthers the PLRA’s Purpose of Preventing Judicial 
Micromanagement Over Prison Administrations 
Reducing the amount of frivolous suits was not Congress’ only concern when 
amending section 1997e(a).  By amending 1997e(a), Congress also plainly intended 
to prevent federal courts from interfering with the management of prison systems.231  
In 1996, Congress created a subsection to 1997e, which dealt directly with frivolous 
prisoner litigation.232  This subsection, 1997e(c), gave the courts the power to dismiss 
suits that were frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a cause of action.233  If 1997e’s 
only objective was to avoid frivolous litigation, then Congress need not go further.234  
Congress, however, continued by amending section 1997e(a) to require exhaustion 
of all federal claims.235  Therefore, when Congress amended 1997e(a), it sought not 
only to bar frivolous prisoner litigation, but also, to reduce the federal judiciary’s 
intervention into the nation’s prison systems by allowing prison administrators to try 
to resolve meritorious claims first.    
Finally, an exception to the exhaustion requirement would undermine Congress’ 
objective of reducing the intervention of federal courts into the management of 
prison systems.  An exception for excessive force claims would require a two-step 
process.  First, the adjudicator would have to decide whether a particular claim arose 
out of an ongoing condition or a specific act of alleged misconduct.236  Then, if the 
                                                                
228See Beeson v. Fishkill Corr. Facility, 28 F. Supp. 2d 884, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
229See McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 143 (1991). 
230Id. 
231See discussion supra Part II.B. 
232See Smith v. Zachary, 255 F.3d 446, 451 (7th Cir. 2001). 
23342 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (1994 & Supp. 1999).  Section 1997e(c) states: 
The court shall on its own motion or on the motion of a party dismiss any action 
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of 
the United States (42 U.S.C. § 1983), or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined 
in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility if the court is satisfied that the action is 
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks 
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.   
In the event that a claim is, on its face, frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 
immune from such relief, the court may dismiss the underlying claim without first 
requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
Id. 
234Smith, 255 F.3d at 451. 
235Id. 
236See Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 102-03 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom, 
Porter v. Nussle, 532 U.S. 1065 (2001).  
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adjudicator decided that the claim was the result of a specific act, the adjudicator 
would have another decision regarding the claim’s legal merit.237  This long and 
difficult two-step process is not a question of fact that could be determined by prison 
administrations.238  Instead, the process is one of legal analysis, which requires the 
legal expertise of the federal judiciary.239  Consequently, an excessive force 
exception would defeat the purpose of the exhaustion requirement because the 
federal judiciary would have to supervise the prison’s activities before the prison had 
a chance to resolve the conflict.240  Therefore, an exception for excessive force 
claims would defeat the PLRA’s purpose of preventing the federal judiciary from 
interfering with prison’s administrative processes. 
The purpose and legislative history of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement 
supports the conclusion that Congress intended to include claims of excessive force.  
When Congress amended section 1997e(a), it expressly stated that the purpose of the 
PLRA amendments was to prevent frivolous prisoner litigation and the federal 
courts’ micromanagement over prison systems.   Creating an exception for excessive 
force claims would defeat these two purposes.  Therefore, when Congress broadened 
section 1997e(a), it deliberately created a comprehensive exhaustion requirement 
that would include claims of excessive force.    
C.  Two Supreme Court Decisions Add to the View that the PLRA’s Exhaustion 
Requirement Includes Claims of Excessive Force 
Two Supreme Court cases confirm the notion that section 1997e(a) requires 
prisoners to exhaust all administrative procedures before filing excessive force 
claims in federal court.  McCarthy v. Bronson241 stands for the proposition that if 
Congress intended the narrower term “conditions of confinement” to include 
excessive force claims, then surely the broader term “prison conditions” includes 
claims of excessive force.242  Therefore, claims of excessive force must be 
administratively exhausted because claims regarding “prison conditions” are subject 
to exhaustion.  Additionally, although the Supreme Court in Booth v. Churner did 
not address the specific issue of an excessive force claim’s subjection to exhaustion, 
by dismissing the case prior to determining the excessive force issue, the Court 
created a presumption that the PLRA requires exhaustion of excessive force claims.  
These reasons support the conclusion that the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
McCarthy and Booth create a strong presumption that prisoners’ excessive force 
claims are subject to the exhaustion requirement. 
1.  McCarthy v. Bronson 
The Supreme Court’s decision in McCarthy v. Bronson adds to the view that the 
exhaustion requirement includes claims of excessive force.  In McCarthy, a prisoner 
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238Id. 
239Id. 
240Id. 
241500 U.S. 136 (1991). 
242See id. 
28https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss1/8
2002-03] TO EXHAUST OR NOT TO EXHAUST? 157 
brought a federal action claiming a correction officer exerted excessive force when 
he transferred the prisoner between cells.243  The District Court found in favor of the 
officers and the prisoner appealed, challenging the court’s referral of the case to a 
magistrate for findings of fact and recommendation of disposition.244  The Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision.245  On writ of certiorari, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, and held that the statutory 
language “prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement” included both 
ongoing practices and isolated acts of misconduct, such as assault.246  Therefore, the 
court concluded, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the District Court could refer the 
prisoners’ excessive force claim to the magistrate judge because the term “conditions 
of confinement” necessarily includes claims of excessive force.247  
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, offered a number of logical reasons for 
including excessive force claims into the phrase “conditions of confinement.”  First, 
Justice Stevens noted that a broad reading of the term “conditions of confinement” is 
appropriate when determining its proper meaning.248  The Court conceded that the 
“most natural reading” of the term “conditions of confinement” would not include 
isolated events, such as claims of excessive force.249  The Court noted, however, that 
the term “conditions of confinement” should not be read “in isolation.”250  The Court 
explained that reading the term in its entirety suggests Congress’ intent to include all 
prisoner petitions, not just claims alleging ongoing or continuous misconduct.251  In 
justifying its position, the Court relied on its decision in Preiser v. Rodriguez.252  In 
this case, the Supreme Court held that specific instances of misconduct were 
encompassed by the term “conditions of confinement.”253  For these reasons, the 
Supreme Court in McCarthy also concluded, the term “conditions of confinement” 
naturally encompasses “single episode cases,” such as an assault.254 
The Court also used Congressional intent behind the amendment to the 
Magistrate’s Act to support its conclusion.  The Court reasoned that Congress 
emphasized greater utilization of magistrates in order to lessen the federal dockets’ 
burden.255  The Court deduced that a definition of “conditions of confinement” 
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246McCarthy, 500 U.S. at 142-44. 
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similar to the one used by the Supreme Court in Preiser, is consistent with Congress’ 
rationale because it permits referrals of an extensive group of cases.256  The Court 
clarified its position by noting that a simpler reading of “conditions of confinement” 
would “avoid[] the litigation that otherwise would inevitably arise when trying to 
identify the precise contours of [a] petitioner’s suggested exception for single 
episode cases.”257  In other words, the Court suggested, an interpretation of the 
definition to exclude isolated events “would generate additional work for the district 
courts because the distinction between cases challenging ongoing conditions and 
those challenging specific acts of alleged misconduct will often be difficult to 
identify.”258  Therefore, the Court concluded, the only way to avoid the inevitable 
burden on the federal dockets would be to include a broad category of prisoner 
actions, including claims regarding isolated events of misconduct, such as assault.259 
By defining the term “prison conditions” in section 3626 of the PLRA, Congress 
intended to circumvent the “plain meaning problem” in McCarthy by clarifying its 
intent to require administrative exhaustion of all prisoner claims, including claims of 
excessive force.260  Congress used a two-part test in defining the term “prison 
conditions.”  And as noted earlier, the Supreme Court in McCarthy already 
interpreted the first part of the definition, “conditions of confinement” to encompass 
all prisoner petitions, even those claiming isolated events of misconduct, such as 
excessive force.261  Congress, however, in a broadening effort, also included the 
phrase “effects of actions by government officials,” which even more closely 
describes isolated events of misconduct than the term “conditions of confinement.”262  
Therefore, by covering all areas of ambiguity, Congress has created a strong 
presumption that it intended the term “prison conditions” to include isolated events 
of misconduct, such as claims of excessive force.263 
2.  Booth v. Churner 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Booth v. Churner also confirms the notion that 
claims of excessive force should be administratively exhausted prior to filing suit in 
federal court.  In Booth, the plaintiff filed an action alleging excessive force by 
prison officials.264  The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit’s ruling that an 
inmate was required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in federal 
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court even where the inmate sought only money damages, which were not available 
through the prison administrative process.265   
The Seventh Circuit in Smith v. Zachary noticed that, although the Supreme 
Court in Booth did not address the specific issue of an excessive force claims’ 
subjection to exhaustion, the Court created a presumption, by dismissing the case 
prior to determining the excessive force issue, that the PLRA requires exhaustion of 
excessive force claims.266   
Also, in addition to this general observation, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Booth can be likened to the present issue plaguing the courts—whether the PLRA 
requires claims of excessive force to be administratively exhausted.  In reaching its 
conclusion, the Supreme Court in Booth explained that the amendments to 1997e(a) 
specifically require prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies, where as prior to 
the amendments, the federal judiciary used its discretion in requiring exhaustion.267  
The Court noted that section 1997e(a) was amended in this way in order to subject 
prisoners’ actions to the exhaustion requirement.268  The Court stated that by doing 
so, Congress intended to deter frivolous claims and promote better-organized 
litigation once a dispute transferred to court.269  Therefore, the Court reasoned, an 
exception would not support Congress’ true intent.270   
The reasoning behind the decision in Booth can be logically equated to the issue 
of whether claims of excessive force are encompassed by the exhaustion 
requirement.  As stated throughout this Note, an exception to the exhaustion 
requirement for excessive force claims would require a judge to decipher whether the 
alleged misconduct was ongoing and continuous or an isolated event.271  As the 
Court in Booth so eloquently stated, exhaustion is no longer the courts’ decision.272  
Therefore, courts should not interfere with the exhaustion process by creating an 
exception, with such blurred lines, that could only be identified by a judiciary.  Also, 
on the same grounds, an exception for excessive force claims would not deter 
frivolous litigation or cultivate better-prepared litigation.  For all these reasons, one 
could fairly interpret the Supreme Court’s decision in Booth to require prisoners to 
exhaust all administrative remedies prior to filing an excessive force claim in federal 
court.   
The Supreme Court in McCarthy v. Bronson, in holding that claims of excessive 
force are included in the term “conditions of confinement,” created a presumption 
that claims of excessive force are also “prison conditions” as defined in section 
3626(g)(2) and therefore, are subject to the exhaustion requirement.273  Additionally, 
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the Supreme Court in Booth v. Churner created a presumption that excessive force 
claims are subject to the exhaustion requirement by dismissing the case prior to 
deciding whether an excessive force claim is included in the exhaustion 
requirement.274  For these reasons, one can safely presume that excessive force 
claims are included in the term “prison conditions” and thus, are subject to the 
exhaustion requirement. 
D.  Efficiency Requires Exhaustion of Excessive Force Claims 
Requiring exhaustion of excessive force claims is the most efficient and effective 
process.  Because a lawsuit is very expensive and time consuming, a prisoner may 
prefer an administrative adjudication before a judicial proceeding.  Additionally, the 
federal judiciary benefits greatly from the decreasing amount of civil litigation.  
Also, administrative adjudication can prove to be extremely valuable to the nation’s 
prisons because such institutions regain the power over day-to-day decisions.  
Moreover, Congressional goals of deterring frivolous prisoner litigation and 
preventing courts from interfering with prisons’ administrative procedures are met.  
For all these reasons, the only efficient and effective process is to require exhaustion 
of excessive force claims. 
Prisoners can still file a lawsuit in federal court.  Some commentators have 
argued that requiring prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies bars a prisoner’s 
constitutional right of access to the courts.275  This argument, however, lacks merit.  
Requiring administrative review does not prohibit a prisoner’s ability to file suit; it 
simply establishes a prerequisite.276  If the prisoner’s claim cannot be resolved 
appropriately at the administrative level, the prisoner is still able to file suit in federal 
court.277   
In fact, for a variety of reasons, a prisoner with a legitimate challenge will 
probably prefer an administrative adjudication over a judicial proceeding.  Litigation 
in courts can take months, even years to complete, which can prove to be 
burdensome for the prisoner financially.278  More importantly, judicial proceedings 
produce results years later.279  Therefore, a more expeditious proceeding, such as an 
administrative adjudication, can prove to be extremely advantageous for an inmate’s 
overall welfare, especially for those inmates claiming excessive force.280  The 
administrative procedure forces the prison to justify or explain its internal 
procedures, which in turn, allows prisons to address the problem quickly.281   The 
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prison system can reprimand or even discharge employees who improperly exert 
excessive force upon a prisoner.282  Also, the prison administration could provide a 
prisoner with monetary remedies or even protection from the abusers fairly rapidly 
after the misconduct occurred, as opposed to years later if a judicial proceeding was 
entered.283  For all these reasons, exhaustion of administrative remedies is incredibly 
helpful for all inmates.  
The federal judiciary also benefits from the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.  
Administrative agencies can provide useful records that prove to be enormously 
useful for future litigation in court.284  Such records focus more clearly on the issues 
at hand.285  Also, these records present the arguments more coherently and 
comprehensively – one of the major concerns that plagued the courts prior to the 
enactment of the PLRA.286  Moreover, the administrative process affords district 
courts more time to address serious concerns.287  By requiring exhaustion, more cases 
are resolved at the administrative level, thereby clearing up the federal judiciary’s 
dockets.288  Therefore, the federal court can spend more time with the meritful and 
complex cases, such as cases involving the use of excessive force.   
Administrative adjudication can prove to be valuable for the prison 
administrations as well.  First, requiring exhaustion prevents outside interference by 
the federal judiciary into the prison’s administrative procedures, thereby allowing the 
prison system to exercise the authority granted to it by the PLRA.289  Moreover, by 
requiring exhaustion, the prison administration is able to preserve financial resources 
because the agency avoids the heavy costs of defending excessive force suits in 
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federal court.290  For these reasons, the most efficient process for prisoner grievances 
is the administrative process. 
The apparent benefit of requiring exhaustion is to achieve Congress’ goals of 
deterring frivolous prisoner litigation and minimizing the courts interference in the 
prisons administrative procedures.  Perhaps, the exhaustion requirement’s most 
effective achievement is meeting these Congressional goals.  By enacting the PLRA, 
Congress hoped to deter frivolous prisoner litigation.291  The exhaustion requirement 
accomplished this pursuit.292  Administrative adjudication helps weed out frivolous 
suits, which in turn, lessens the burden on the courts, thereby affording the court 
more time to hear meritful prisoner claims.293  Additionally, exhaustion requires 
prisoners to take their claims to the administrative procedure first, which returns the 
administrative power back to the prisons.294  Therefore, by meeting the intended 
goals of Congress, the exhaustion requirement has proved to be both efficient and 
effective. 
Efficiency and effectiveness demand the courts to disallow any exceptions for the 
exhaustion requirement.  The exhaustion requirement proves to be extremely 
beneficial, not only for the federal judiciary and the prison administrations, but also 
for the prisoner.  Also, Congressional goals, by themselves, provide enough reasons 
for requiring excessive force claims to be administratively exhausted.  For these 
reasons, the only efficient and effective process is the administrative grievance 
process. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In an effort to halt the enormous trend of frivolous prisoner litigation and the 
overabundance of judicial interference into the American prison systems, Congress 
enacted a necessary and appropriate piece of legislation, the Prisoner Litigation 
Reform Act.  Despite the apparent clarity of the legislation, conflict has arisen 
among the Appellate Courts regarding the exhaustion requirement.   
The Supreme Court should settle the apparent conflict among the circuits by 
requiring all prisoner claims to be administratively exhausted, even claims of 
excessive force.  The Court should follow the definition of “prison conditions” 
provided in section 3626(g)(2) of the PLRA because Congressional intent, as well as 
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Supreme Court precedent, supports applying section 3626’s definition of “prison 
conditions.”  By applying this definition, acts of excessive force would fall into the 
category of “prison conditions,” and as such, claims of excessive force would require 
exhaustion.   
Additionally, requiring exhaustion of excessive force claims is the most efficient 
and effective process, not only for the prison administrations and the federal 
judiciary, but also for the prisoner.  Moreover, exhaustion of excessive force claims 
furthers Congressional goals of deterring frivolous prisoner litigation, preventing 
judicial micromanagement over prisons, lessening the burden on the federal docket, 
and decreasing the waste of taxpayer dollars.  For all these reasons, the Supreme 
Court should find that the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA requires all federal 
claims to be administratively exhausted before filing suit in federal court, even 
claims of excessive force. 
DANIELLE M. MCGILL295 
                                                                
295B.B.A., 2000, University of Miami; M.B.A., 2003, Cleveland State University; J.D., 
2003, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University.  The author dedicates 
this Note to John and Diane McGill for their constant support and encouragement, and wishes 
to thank Professor Carolyn Broering-Jacobs, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, for her 
guidance. 
35Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2002
